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Charting from within a
Grounded Concept of
Member Control
TIwmas W. Gray and Gillian Butler
Organizational charts of membership structures can be useful tools for monitoring
member control when they accurately depict a concept ofcontrol grounded in context
and theory. This paper develops the concept "member control" by placing it within
cooperative principles and democratic theory. From this perspective, members control
theirorganization when, through a democratic processofdecision making, they areable
to keep the cooperative a cooperative, a condition we call "containment." With this
conceptual development, a containment method of member control charting is devel-
oped and illustrative examples given.
Businesses routinely use organizational charts to clarify their internal struc-
tures, especially theirauthoritystructures. Cooperative businesses useorganiza-
tional charts as well, but often omit an essential component, namely, member
authorities. This omission is due in part to the incomplete treatment given
"member control" in cooperative and sociological literature.
This papersuggests organizationalchartsofmemberstructures can be useful
tools for understanding and contributing to member control of agricultural
cooperatives. To be useful, however, member charts must accurately reflect a
conceptofmembercontrolthatis groundedincontextand theory.The purpose
of this paper is to clarify the term "member control" by examining its context
within cooperative principles, controversy around the term, and its roots in
democratic theory. This "grounded" concept of member control is then used
to construct membership charts.
Grounding Member Control in Context and Controversy
Cooperative Principles and Definitions
Traditional definitions ofa "cooperative" suggest a business that adheres to
a setofprinciples thatfocus theenterpriseonanobligation to provideservice to
members, ratherthanonstrictly generatingincome. Thereareseveral different
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versions of these principles, but all are organized around common themes.
Briscoe et al. (p. 40) suggest five different aspects:
1. Openand voluntary membershipconfined to all persons using the coop-
erative, with no discrimination on the basis ofrace, sex, politics, religion,
or family background.
2. Ownership of the cooperative by member-users only.
3. Control of the cooperative vested with members. Organization of the
cooperative shouldencourage member participation in decision making
and balloting on a one member, one vote basis.
4. Benefits received by members in proportion to their use ofthe coopera-
tive.
5. Return on investment set at a limited rate of interest.
Dunn (p. 85) suggests a more succinct version:
1. The User-Owner Principle: People whoownandfinance thecooperative
are those who use the cooperative.
2. The User-Control Principle: People who control the cooperative are
those who use the cooperative.
3. The User-Benefits Principle: The cooperative's sole purpose is to pro-
vide and distribute benefits to its users on the basis of their use.
Member control via democratic process is seen by some as the core principle
and central to various definitions of cooperatives (Schomisch and Mirowsky,
p.4).
A cooperative is a business voluntarily owned and controlled by its
member patrons, and operated by them on a nonprofit or cost basis.
(Schaars, p. 7)
Cooperative societies are democratic organizations. Their affairs
should be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner
agreed by the members and accountable to them. Members ofprimary
societies should enjoy equal rights of voting (one member, one vote)
and participation in decisions affecting their societies. (International
Cooperative Alliance, p. 39)
The foregoing principles and definitions have provided historic guidelines in
an attemptto ensure that members are the users and thatmember-userscontrol
the cooperative. They seek to realize an equitable distribution ofpower among
membersand to exclude from participation nonuserinvestors who might trans-
form the original purposes of the cooperative.
In general, when cooperatives are small no single principle provides such
challenges as to shake the feasibility of an organization or compromise the
principled integrity of existing organizations. When cooperatives become large
anddecision makingbecomescomplex, "membercontrol"inparticularbecomes
problematic and has led to controversy around its application. I
Member Control Controversy
Kravitz (p. 2) has charged that"farmercooperatives have tamperedwith their
organization's most unique feature. This uniqueness is a business enterprise
that is aggressively democratic and has more than pecuniary interests."84 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
Breimyer has made similar charges in the past, stating that as cooperatives
expanded and tookon more complex organizational shapes, defining coopera-
tive characteristics were altered. In this new eraofsize, management frequently
has few ifany personalconnections to agricultureorto farmer-members. Mem-
bership often becomes limited arbitrarily, volume voting is initiated, and fre-
quently no procedures are provided for the hearing of grievances.
Torgerson (p. 18) perhaps summarized some of the issues best, suggesting
that as cooperatives competed in the marketplace and gained size and market
strength, manyleadersadopteda "corporatementalityofmanagement."Rather
thanjustify their existence on the basis ofself-help programs for farmers, they
leveraged their position politically, societally, and economically as "beingjust
like any other business." This posture has tended to emphasize "profits" rather
than member participation and [ifin the extreme] can reduce member roles to
those similar to "passive stockholders."
These observations should not be taken lightly, even by cooperative leaders
less committedto cooperative principles. Whencooperatives have beenattacked
in the public arena, it is often with the charge that cooperatives are no longer
controlled by their members and therefore no longer deserve special tax privi-
leges and legal immunities (Cook, p. 4). Our purposes here are not to debate
the accuracy ofthese statements butto make the controversy explicit. Although
less focused in recentyears, thecontroversyfuels misunderstandingsofmember
control and underscores a need for clarity, as well as for monitoring its applica-
tion within cooperatives.
Organizational Size, Participation, and Member Control Studies
Several studies haveattemptedto linkcooperativesize to controlinanattempt
to documentwhethersize affects membercontrol. Manyofthese studies opera-
tionalize control as participation in meetings, holding offices, and/or voting.
Earlier works tend to conclude "the larger the organization, the smaller the
proportions ofmembers who participate" (Warner and Hilander, p. 39). More
recent works do not find this relationship (Lasley; Elitzak and Boynton; Als).
However, few of these studies handle the concept "member control" ade-
quately. Most are content with participation measures as membercontrol itself,
orvery good indicatorsofit (Lasley, p. 3-10). Yet large proportionsofmembers
could do all these things and still not be in control of the cooperative. In his
excellent review ofthe literature, Ollila implicitly suggests "influence" on deci-
sion making is a more appropriate concept to look at, rather than member
control. Surely control does involve influence, but this term is too narrow to
adequately capture it fully.
In one ofthe few serious attempts to explain member control, Boynton and
Elitzak (p. 2, 3) state control is "the ability ofan individual or group to affect
an organization's objectives and the strategies used in the pursuit of those
objectives." Control may be "active," and involve such acts as voting, serving on
committees, and holding office, or "passive," "the amount ofcontrol members
could exercise if dissatisfied with the cooperative."
Most, if not all the participation-control studies take an active approach to
member control that pivots around various questions. How do members con-
trol? Whatavenues do they use? How muchcontrol do they perceive they have?Member Control/Gray and Butler 85
How much control do they perceive they should have? How much do members
participate?
Contained in these questions is the foregone conclusion that control is a
matter of degree. And in an active, practical sense this is surely true. But if
cooperatives are in members' control by degree, then they are also out of
members' control by degree. Most of the empirical studies of member control
count any manifestation of control-such as voting or participation-as evi-
dence ofactive control, but are not designed to uncover any lack of"passive,"
or potential control.
Furthermore, threaded through many ofthese studies is a sense ofseparate-
ness between thecooperativeandmembers,ormanagementandmembers. The
word "cooperative" is often used in place of management and operations, as
though members and the cooperativeare two separateentitiesand "operations"
is mostly what is meant by "the cooperative."
Our interest here is passive or potential control. Cooperatives may take vari-
ous shapes to accommodate varyingconditions. However, immutable should be
the members' ability-within the defining limits oforganized cooperation-to
shape the organization into whatever form they collectively need it to be.
Grounding Member Control
In his seminal work on epistemology, Kaplan (p.42) suggests concepts cannot
be understood separate from and outside the context in which they are used.
Their "meaning depends on their relations to other concepts as fixed by their
place in the theory..." "Member control" cannot be understood outside its
treatment within cooperative principles. Therefore, at a minimum, members
control their organization when, through a democratic process of decision
making, theyareable to keepthecooperativeacooperative, i.e., anorganization:
(1) oriented to meeting their democratically defined needs and objectives in a
fashion thatbenefitsmember-usersinproportionto use, (2) ownedandfinanced
by the member-users, and (3) continuing to reproduce itself as a democratic
organization.
Meaning of "member control" can be further understood as nested within
concepts of"democracy." A complete handling of the term democracy is well
beyond the scope of this paper. However, a partial treatment is necessary.
In state systems, democracy is considered a form ofdecision making allowing
largenumbersofpeopleto participateandcontainingprovisionsforsovereignty
and equality.2 Craig refers to sovereignty as the capability of people to create
and affect decisions on how the system should operate and change. Equality, a
subset ofsovereignty, refers to individual access to decision making. It asks if
articulation possibilities are evenly distributed amongcitizens. However, sover-
eignty's meaning is somewhat broader than Craig's treatment. Sovereignty
refers to the possession of ultimate authority by a person or group.
In a cooperative the membership is sovereign. The membership is the origin
of all authority within the cooperative, and, while delegations are made, all
authority should be derived from and revocable by the members. The coopera-
tive, ultimately, and following democratic principles, is the members. We seek
then to develop a method of charting that reflects this concept of authority;
charting that conveys a cooperative bounded by its members and constrained
by the authority embodied in its members.86 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION
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Organizational Charts of Membership Structures
This section presents a series of charts of member control structures. Our
stated purpose is to develop a charting methodology consistent with a
"grounded" concept of member control. We begin with rudimentary abstract
charts and conclude with empirical examples of complex structures in the
cooperative community.
Abrahamsen (p. 40) presents a chart ofmembership relationships in macro-
structures ofcooperatives (figure 1). In the federated cooperative, farmers are
members ofa local cooperative, and the local is in turn a member ofa regional
cooperative. In the centralized cooperative, farmers are members of the
regional, and may do business with a local branch, but do not hold membership
in the local branch. In a mixed cooperative, some farmers hold membership in
the regional, others in a local cooperative, and the local in turn holds member-
ship in the regional. Regionals themselves may bemembersofan interregional.
Although this chart is excellent for showing differing membership relations
between cooperative types, it says nothing about micromember control struc-
tures. Itdoes notdepict the internal membercontrol structureofa cooperative.
Garoyan and Mohn (p. 169) display a more elaborate chart of"elected posi-
tions" in an abstract cooperative example (figure 2). Members in geographic
districts elect delegates who in turn elect members of the board of directors.
These "directors at large" may come from any geographic location within the
cooperative membership area. District delegates may also elect a district direc-
tor, who sits with the "directors at large" on the board of directors.
This chart begins to describe the internal governance structure ofa coopera-
tive. Members are placed highest on the chart as origins of authority. This
authority is delegated downward to a decision-makingboard ofdirectors. Dele-
gations are madethrough anelection process thatseeks representativeness with
geographicdistricting. As anabstract model, this chartdoes well in representing
the flows of authority, delegations of decision making via an election process,
and member representativeness. Empirically however, a governance structure
may involve appointed, as well as elected, bodies and committees with and
without independent authorities. Further, there is no place on the chart for
depicting breaches in member control.
Butler was the first to depict membership structures visually by charting all
member substructures and, in doing so, specifying rules and standards for
charting.3 She suggests conventions illustrated in figure 3a: (I) elected positions
represented by solid outlines, (2) appointed positions by brokenlines, (3) bodies
with independent decision-making authority by rectangles, and (4) bodies with
no independent authority (they are strictly advisory) by circles.
Figure 3b is the member chartofan existing farm supply cooperative. Mem-
bers are organized into eight districts. Following Butler's conventions we find
members in each district elect respectively, a director to sit on the board of
directors, a resolutions committee member to sit on a resolutions committee,
and a redistricting committee member to sit on a redistricting committee. An
executive committee is elected outofthe board ofdirectors. Six committees are
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Source: Abrahamsen, p. 40.
long-range planning, annual meeting, and improvement. Three bodies have
independent decision-making authority: the board of directors and the redis-
tricting and improvement committees. All other committees must go to their
originating bodies for approval of their decisions.
Butler's charting procedure gives more information about member gover-
nance structures than previous methods. Origins and delegations of authority
are clearly depicted. Distinctions between elected and appointed positions and
between bodies with and without independent authorities are made clear. The88 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
Figure 2.-Elected Positions
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chart also provides indications of the range ofspecializations within the struc-
tureas well as signs ofhow much formal power is wielded within specializations,
i.e., independent authority or not.
Although the chart provides a visual representationofthe governance struc-
ture, it does not allow for a grounded sense of member control. Are any of
the bodies enabled to act outside members' authorities? The chart gives no
indication. Furthermore, some cooperative scholars suggest placing members
at the bottom of charts inverts true authority relationships. Delegations begin
with members and are best shown delegated downwards.Member Control/Gray and Butler 89
Figure 3a.-Abstract Member Control Structure-Buder Method
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The Containment Method of Charting Member Control
Our discussion of member control yielded a grounded concept that put
in place notions of cooperative reproduction and member sovereignty, i.e.,
reproducingthecooperativeas a cooperativewithin thecollective andsovereign
interests of the members. We seek then to develop a method ofcharting that
reflects this conceptofauthority-chartingthatconveys a cooperative bounded
by its members and constrained by the authority embodied in its membership.
Figure4 demonstratesthecontainmentmethodofcharting. Thisis thesupply
cooperative presented in figure 3b. The most obvious difference between con-
tainment-methodchartsandthe previouschartsis thatmembersvisuallycontain
the other committees and bodies. Members, having ultimate authority, contain
all other membership structures. This convention of containment follows on
into the structure. The five appointed board committees have no independent
authority separate from the board. As such they are contained within the board
rectangle.
The previously listed charting conventions hold: (I) Elected positions are
represented by solid lines, (2) appointed positions by broken lines, (3) bodies
with independent decision-making authority by rectangles, and (4) bodies with
no independent authority by circles. A reader monitoring member control
might find the "improvements committee" worthy ofcloser examination. It is
appointed by the board but exists outside board authorities. It is notan elected90 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
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body, yet it has independent authorities. It is contained within membership
authorities however. Memberinterests mightask who sits on the committeeand
for how long? Are committee members representative ofthe membership, and
with what authorizations can they act without board approval?
Figure 5 illustrates a more complete modeling, reflecting a deepening in
charting conventions. The chart represents an existing dairy cooperative. In
this cooperative, members elect delegates, resolutions committee members,
redistricting committee members, and division boards. The division boards
contain five committees that are appointed from within the division boards and
have no independent authority outside ofthem. Delegates elect the association
board and an association-level resolutions committee. The association board
contains five committees with no independent authority. Since the association
board has the broadest decision-making authority, it is placed above division
boards and committees. Since delegates elect association board members, they
are placed above the association board.
There are appointment relationships (designated by broken lines) between
the division boards and the redistricting and division-level resolutions commit-
tees. A nonvoting chair is appointed by the boards to sit on these committees.
A similar relationship exists between the association board and the association-
level resolutions committee and the three subsidiaries, i.e., finance, cooperative
relations, and dairy products promotion.Member Control/Gray and Butler 91
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The members surround nearly everything in the chart, with some important
exceptions. The association board of directors has the power to change the
bylaws oftheorganizationandthereforetheorganizationitself. Thispowerthen
extends the authorities ofthe association board outside ofmembers' sovereign
rights, out of their control, and threatens members' ability to maintain the
organization as a cooperative.
The subsidiaries represent a similar relationship. The finance subsidiary is
composedofthe farmer-members appointed to the association finance commit-
tee. This subsidiary borrows money and makes funds available as loans to
cooperative members, haulers, and other operational affiliates. Loans are
underwrittenby thecooperativeas a whole. Thecooperativerelationssubsidiary
is composed of farmer-members appointed to the membership and public
relations committee. Itfunctions to offer group health and life insurance plans
to members. The dairy product promotion subsidiary is composed of farmer-
members appointed to the marketing committee. This subsidiary determines
disbursements to generic milk promotion funds. Although these subsidiaries92 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
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report to the association board, they do not require any approval from the
board for any of their actions. They are beyond member control.
Recommendations to this cooperative, based on relationships apparent from
the chart, would advise thatbylaws powers bebroughtback within the member-
ship circle and that subsidiaries be closely assessed and examined for violation
of member authorities.
Conclusion
Containment method charting is designed to empirically describe what is,
and to do so in a fashion that reflects assumptions embedded in the principles
ofcooperative organization and democratic theory. The authors do not claim
that all relevant power and authority relationships can be revealed in this
fashion. Charts depict formal membership structure.Member Control/Gray and Butler 93
However, containment charting accurately depicts member sovereignty as
crucial to membercontrol. Itgrounds theconceptofmembercontrolin theory.
It forces the reader to think of cooperatives in terms of membership. It can
help make the membership system understandable to cooperative participants
and enhance their ability to access and monitor the governance system. If
members are aware of who is responsible for particular decisions, they will be
better prepared to express their approval (or lack thereof) at election time.
And standardization ofcharting procedures may make it possible to compare
structuresofvarious cooperativesandbegin toresearch the performanceconse-
quences of alternative structures.
Notes
l. Obviously control is not the only principles-based problem cooperatives face. For
example, the limits on investment from outside sources and raising sufficient capital to
meet the needs of the organization are major.
2. Italso includes issues oflibertyand majority rule. Liberty-socialfreedom, political
freedom, and economic freedom-is taken as a given, irrespective ofsize. Majority rule
is more problematic and must be, at least in part, defined by participation in the system.
In some sense it is a function of sovereignty. This author chose to discuss sovereignty
and equality because they are more clearly affected by changes in scale and coterminous
with historical conceptions ofcooperative member control.
3. The reader is referred to Van De Ven and Ferry for an extensive discussion on
the importance of standardized charting procedures. Unfortunately for cooperative
researchers, they limit their discussion to operations' structures.
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Sunbury,Ben. TheFalloftheFarmCreditEmpire. Ames: IowaStateUniversity
Press, 1988, 264 pp.
Shocks producedby macroeconomic policies andeventsofthe 1980s revealed
structural faults created by policies and practices of preceding decades in
numerous institutions previously regarded as successes in U.S. financial mar-
kets. Among such institutions was the proud cooperative Farm Credit System.
The System was born in 1916, structurally completed in 1933, fiscally indepen-
dentby 1968 (FederalLandBanks, 1947),andlargely freed oflendingrestraints
in 1971. It responded in the 1970s with unprecedented growth, only to be
brought to its knees in the 1980s and then "rescued" by legislation in 1985-87
that reformed the System and placed it on a path with a destination uncertain
at the time the hook (and this review) was written.
Sunbury provides a highly readable account of"The Fall" and rescue with a
strong political focus, both inside and outside the System. He was executive
assistant to three Farm CreditAdministration (FCA) governors priorto his own
retirement in 1988. His book is an early contribution to what is sure to be a
burgeoning literatureon institutional failure in financial markets generally and
on those institutions specifically concerned with agriculture and its related
sectors. Withjournalistic skills Sunbury identifies principal legislative actors as
well as influential actors within the System and the FCA, the System's regulator,
itself an important part of the story.
The System is a nondepository lender, wholly dependent for its loanable
funds on sales of debt instruments in financial markets. To acquire funds at
interestrates that make theSystemcompetitivewithotherfarm lendersrequires
that investors have a high level ofconfidence in the quality of the debt instru-
ments. The confidence is built on strength from joint liability among the Sys-
tem's lenders and "agency status" with respect to the U.S. government.
The market's perception of implicit support from the government-i.e.,
"agency status"-is discussed rather fully in chapter 2 and again in chapter 4.
Also discussed is the related concept ofjoint liability among System lenders,
along with the thorny issue ofeach lender's obligations to its own stockholders
(p. 36). However, less attention is given to the System's problem as a sector-
specialized lender whose strength through diversification is limited largely to
geographic dimensions, and thus is associated with joint liability among its
geographically distributed lenders.
The System was begun with district Federal Land Banks (FLBs) and Federal
Land Bank Associations (FLBAs), thelatteroperatingas agentsofFLBs. Nearly
two decades later, Production Credit Associations (PCAs) were established to
lend directly to farmers, discounting notes received with district Federal Inter-
mediate Credit Banks (FICBs). Since their establishment in 1923, FICBs had
failed to attract lending relations with commercial banks, which was attributed,
weakly, to their remoteness from farmers (p. 6). The farmer thus faced two
separately organized lenders within the System, a structure seenby many (Sun-
buryincluded)as bureaucraticallyflawed andcostly forbothfarmerandSystem.
The rescue-related merging of FLB/FLBAs with FICB/PCAs is accepted
uncritically-evenwelcomed-asa reformlongoverdue(chapter5). Thenotion96 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
of a comprehensive "one-stop" lender is appealing. Yet the separation needs
more ofan explanation than is suggested by the quote from the popular FCA
Governor Robert Tootell that "the banks were started at different times for
what seem to be different reasons" (p. 68). Why does the market generate
separation outside the System? Why does the law differentiate between real
estate and non-real estate loan contracts? Merging doubtless will continue (i.e.,
p. 77) though the gains may be a bit overstated.
Less attention is given to the Banks for Cooperatives (BCs), but chapter 10
contains a rather extensive discussion offarmer cooperatives. The discussion is
interesting and insightful, though somewhat digressive in the general context
ofthe book. It might have been more relevant to ask why the financial stress of
the 1980s seemed to have had less impacton BCs thanonotherSystem lenders.
After all, the incidence ofbankruptcy and other stress among farmers was no
greater than amongfarm-related firms in supplyand productmarkets. Is there
an explanation in the structural aspects of BCs? In management? Are there
useful implications for other System lenders?
Perhaps ofgreatest interest is the treatment oftensions between the (public)
FCA and the (private) cooperative Farm Credit System. The Farm Credit Act
of 1953, characterized by Sunbury as the System's "declaration of indepen-
dence" (p. 133), removed the FCA from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
and made it an independent agency. Though an official government agency,
funded by congressional appropriations, FCA passed all expenses through to
System lenders who paid them, thus establishing that the entire organization
was free ofgovernment support. Unfortunately, it may, as well, have led to the
perceptionofFCA as the System's "WashingtonOffice," its liaison andadvocate
with the Congress and executive department, and a subtle weakening, over
time,ofthearm'slength"role inwhich FCA dischargedits regulatoryobligation.
The rescue converted the relationship of FCA to the System from advocate to
adversary.
The Farm CreditActof1953 also established the Federal FarmCreditBoard,
an independent agency. Its largely nonpolitical operation is suggested by Sun-
bury to explain the board's effectiveness, which crested with the passage ofthe
Farm Credit Act of 1971. The board was replaced, in the rescue legislation of
1985, by a three-member FCA Board, which quickly established a political
agenda. An importantargumentofthe book is that this politicization, although
nota cause ofthe "The Fall," is likely to impede the recovery ofthe System and
thus is not in the best long run interest of agriculture.
Though Sunbury portrays a generally positive historical view ofthe System,
he strangely fails to mention importantinnovations made by the System. Exam-
ples are the amortized farm mortgage loan, introduced by the FLBs, and the
budgeted loan, introduced by the PCAs. Both, ofcourse, have long since been
copied by other farm lenders. Yet they, and other lending innovations, suggest
the important role played by System lenders as competitors in agriculture's
financial markets.
Sunbury raised no question on what part(s) of the System might make the
most sense to save. It would be difficult to do so when arguing so strongly for
merger among System lenders. Also, to do so would require a more substantial
review ofSystem history, includingthe trial withJointStock Land Banks along-
side the FLBs and the FICB experience preceding the PCAs.Book Review/Blakley 97
One must return to the two decades centered on 1920 for a periodofmacro-
economic shocks on agriculture comparable with those ofthe 1970s and 1980s.
The former led to the structure of the System that performed so well, on the
whole, in the long period before the 1980s. How well might it have performed
in the absence of the legislation of 1971? Do we have substantial reasons for
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Reeves, james L. The First 20 Years The Story of Mid-America Dairymen.
Republic, Mo.: Western Printing Company, 1989,291 pp.
Reeves' book describes the activities, people, economic conditions, and prob-
lems leading to the formation and operation ofregional dairy marketing coop-
eratives in thecentral UnitedStates. Although thebookcenterson Mid-America
Dairymen, Inc. (Mid-Am) and its predecessororganizations, theevents, frustra-
tions, policies, and actions were similar for all regional cooperatives formed
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The first five chapters, which provide the historical setting, tell of the milk
producers' intense determination to change the termsoftrade for the products
they marketed. Reeves describes the economic climate of the 1950s and early
1960s: the declining levels of price supports for milk, the increasing numbers
of federal milk marketing orders, the growing size of processing firms, the
overlapping of market areas of large firms, and the backward integration of
chain stores into processing milk and dairy products.
The catalyst for action was the 1964 Lehigh Valley court decision. Many
industry leaders thought this decision would remove all compensatory payment
provisions from the federal order pricing and cause individual markets to be
subjectto predatoryactions by processingfirms andcooperativeslocatedoutside
the local market areas.
Associated Dairymen, Inc. representedthefirst attemptby producercoopera-
tives to form anorganizationthatcouldincrease farm incomes. Reeves describes
the circumstances leading to the formation of this federation of cooperatives
and its early success in negotiating over-order premiums in some markets.
There was a vision ofeven greater gains ifproducers were represented by only
one large cooperative that could change the balance of power in negotiations
with thedecreasing numbersoflarge processingfirms. Theblueprintfor future
actions by dairycooperatives providedby theDairy MarketAdvisory Committee
helped cooperative leaders and members make decisions for joint action.
Mid-America Dairymen was formed onJuly 1,1968, with the consolidation
ofcooperatives in the St. Louis-Ozarks Marketing Association (SLOMA), Mid-
America DairymenofKansas City, and ProducersCreameryCompanyofChilli-
cothe. It would have been informative ifReeves had also described the events,
disagreements, and persons involved in forming two regional cooperatives,98 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
Associated Milk Producers, Inc. (AMPI) and Mid-Am, rather than a single
cooperative for the region.
Mid-Am's internal organization and its mechanisms to obtain capital from its
members were two major issues to be resolved in order to operate the firm
successfully. Reeves describes the initial organization with four divisions and
100 districts, with each district representing approximately the same volume of
milk. He also tells of the board's decision to hold executive sessions where the
dairy farmer board members could hold discussions without the presence of
the hired employees.
Many producer associations merged with Mid-Am during 1969 and the early
seventies. Among the larger mergers described in the book were those with
Central States Dairy Cooperative and Twin City Milk Producers Association.
Two major legal problems plagued Mid-Am during the early seventies. The
first involved the National Farmer Organization controversy over the validity
ofcontracts with producers. Legal suits and countersuits began in 1971; subse-
quent court rulings and appeals of ruling continue to this day.
The second legal problem was related to the apparent attitude of the U.S.
Justice Department that the Capper-Volstead Act should not be valid for
regional cooperatives. The Justice Department filed an antitrust suit against
Mid-Am in December 1973; anearliersuit had been filed againstAMPI. Rather
than continue with mounting legal fees, Mid-Am signed a consent decree in
1976. Then, in 1980 theJustice Department charged that Mid-Am had failed
tocomply with the consentdecree provision that requiredthesale oftwo plants.
Mid-Am said no buyers could be found. Thejudge ruled in Mid-Am's favor.
The Mid-Am board was also concerned with the position ofconsumeractivist
groups that prices ofdairy products were too high. Reeves discusses the actions
of the board to invite consumer leaders to board meetings and to promote
interactions between consumers and dairy farmers.
Seasonal shortages of milk in Class I markets have been problems for the
industry. Reeves describes the potential solution provided by the Associated
Reserve Standby Pool Cooperative (ARSPC) and Mid-Am's membership in,
withdrawal from, and re-entry into ARSPC.
Reeves discusses the disastrous year of 1974 when Mid-Am suffered large
inventory losses from the change in price supports, which tilted prices down-
ward on butter and nonfat dry milk, and the reduction in domestic sales of
powder because ofthe large increase in imports, especially casein.
Inaneffortto dealwith these losses, theboardvoted for a negative allocation,
which meant that the loss would be allocated to each 1974 member. The alloca-
tion resulted in a membership loss.
In 1975,Gary Hanman, Mid-Am'sseniorcorporatevice president, was named
general manager, and Tom Townsend, formerly director of special projects,
was named corporate vice president.
Reeve cites that 90 percentofresolutions adopted at Mid-Am's annual meet-
ings have dealt with a law or regulation that affected dairying or dairy farmers.
ADEPT (Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust) is a political trust
formed in 1970 by a group of dairy farmers and controlled by a committee
representing contributors to the political action fund. Close coordination
between the committee and the Mid-Am board and management ensures that
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employees. Participation has grown from II percent of Mid-Am members to
more than 50 percent.
The book also discusses problems with surplus milk production during the
1980s and Mid-Am's self-help program where producers shared in the cost of
government purchases.
Additional Mid-Am activities reviewed by Reeves include:
• Member services: producer benefits for disasters; contaminated milk and
health insurance; education programs for fieldmen, milk haulers, and
producers; and young cooperator programs. (Chapter XXIV)
• Forays into the trucking industry from 1964 through 1980, when the
industry was deregulated. (Chapter XXVI)
• Identificationofmarkets for new products and research and development
accomplishments, which included ultra pasteurization, a carbonated milk
beverage, specialized dried dairy ingredients, and an ultrafiltrated cheese-
making process. In 1988 Mid-Am was named Processor of the Year by
Dairy Foods magazine. (Chapters XXV and XXVII)
• Advertising and promotion investments. Mid-Am and other producers
have contributed funds to the American Dairy Association, the National
Dairy Council, and Dairy Research, Inc. for programs in advertising, nutri-
tion education, and research. (Chapter XXX)
• Growth through mergers andjoint ventures. Names, locations, and prod-
ucts produced by Mid-Am processing plants. Activities in advertising, pro-
motion, nutrition education, and product development. Leadership roles
of Mid-Am members. Biographies of management personnel. Listing of
board members and officers. (Chapters XXVIII through XXXIII)
In summary, Reeves has provided an excellent account of the activities and
circumstancessurroundingthe formation andoperationofMid-AmericaDairy-
men, Inc. Itis recommended thatthe book be on the readinglist for all students
involved in agricultural marketing and all persons involved in dairy marketing
or cooperative activities.
Leo V. Blakley
Professor Emeritus ofAgricultural Economics
Oklahoma State University
Torgerson, Truman. Building Markets and People Cooperatively: The Lake to
Lake Story. Appleton, Wis: Graphic Communications, Inc., 1990,352 pp.
This book describes the 35-year history of a successful northeast Wisconsin
dairy cooperative from start-up to eventual mergerwith a regional cooperative.
The author, Truman Torgerson, was involved in establishing Lake to Lake
and was its only manager. Torgerson describes the trials and tribulations of
organizing and operating the cooperative and the humorous events and per-
sonal tragedies of the people who were involved. Readers of the book quickly
sense Torgerson's personal pride in Lake to Lake and his dedication to the
economic well-being of farmers.
The story begins in March 1945, when two dairy farmers from Manitowoc
County, Wisconsin, came to Truman Torgerson, then a county agricultural100 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
agent. They represented a small cheese cooperative of 21 members. Although
post-World II days were relatively good times for agriculture, these farmers
recognized the need to merge local cooperatives into a cooperative with a larger
and more flexible plant. Farmers in northeast Wisconsin did not have a Grade
A market at that time, and as a result milk prices were below the state average.
These dairy farmers wanted to enter the Grade A market where prices were
higher.
With Truman Torgerson's help, they formed a small committee of farmers
to study the Grade A market alternatives. On December 8, 1945, nearly 500
dairy farmers attended a countywide meeting where the Lake to Lake idea was
presented. Farmers were asked to sign a contract to commit their milk to the
cooperative for five years. The goal of500 farmer-members or 10,000 cows was
achieved byJuly 1946, and a formal organizational meetingwas held. Financing
was 10 dollars per cow, with a goal of$200,000. ByJuly 1948 farmer-members
had surpassed that goal by committing $438,740.
The author attributes the early success ofLake to Lake to a winning team of
employees and strong communication links. Early employees possessed leader-
shipability, milk processingexpertise, andfinancial managementskills. Because
Torgersonsaw the needto keepdirectorsandmembersinformed,two regularly
scheduled written communications were prepared-"The Director Drift" and
"Member Memos."These two communicationlinks continuedthroughoutLake
to Lake's 35 years.
The importance ofa cooperative's community involvement comes out strong
in the book. The community of Kiel, Wisconsin, recognized the value of Lake
to Lake. When the dairy plant faced a waste disposal problem, the community
supported a bond referendum for a new sewage treatment plant.
Lake to Lake's original goal was to produce and market cheese, and cheese
manufacturing began in 1949. Lake to Lake signed an agreement to market all
its cheese through Land O'Lakes, which established a lasting loyalty to the
regional cooperative. It wasn't long, however, before Lake to Lake had estab-
lished its own Lake to Lake brand identity for cheese. Lake to Lake agreed to
market in other than Land O'Lakes territory.
At the urging of members, Lake to Lake merged with another cooperative
and entered the milk bottling business. Later, it acquired more dairies and
added ice cream to its product line.
Lake to Lake established its own set ofsix cooperative operating principles,
which stated that the cooperative should: (1) Operate and conduct business in
a manner that will command the respect ofothers in the industry. (2) Attempt
to operate the cooperative so that a ready line ofcredit will be available in time
ofneed. (3) Be free to take risks in the interestofmembers when it is advisable
to do so. (4) Employ capable personnel and compensate them properly. (5)
Operate to help members improve their economic position. (6) Retain the
cooperative's independence from political parties and from government help
to the greatest extent possible.
Lake to Lake also believed that all employees were of utmost importance to
the success of the organization and recognized both employees and members
fortheirachievements. Believingthatcooperativeeducationwas the responsibil-
ity of the cooperative, Lake to Lake developed a young cooperators program.
The author describes the mid-1960s as oneofthe more vexing and challeng-
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Farmers Organization (NFO), which attacked cooperatives for doing nothing
to help farmers. There were anti-Torgerson rallies, milk dumpings, bullets
through milk tank trucks, fence cuttings, and other harsh activities against
farmers who did notjoin NFO.
In 1966, the Ghicago Federal Milk MarketingOrder was voted out. The fluid
milk market was in turmoil. Lake to Lakejoined with six other cooperatives to
form Central Milk Sales Agency tojointly sell milk in Chicago. It later became
the Central Milk Producers Cooperative, a federated marketingagency in com-
mon for the Chicago market.
In the chapters of the book that describe the 1970s, the author tells of the
early leaders, directors, employees, and members of Lake to Lake. Torgerson
also describes the 1970s as a period ofactive legislative effortby dairy coopera-
tives through the National Milk Producers Federation. Dairy price support
legislation, countering attacks against the Capper Volstead Act, and dairy
import protection were among key legislative activities.
In 1980, the last year ofLake to Lake's independence, sales of$130 million
and earnings of $3.6 million were new records. Despite its success, Lake to
Lake believed that the greater economies ofsize, variety, market research, and
advertising that would be possible through a merger with Land O'Lakes would
bring increased opportunities for their farmers.
The author describes the great care that went into the merger with Land
O'Lakes. After 18 months of negotiations and planning, 83.1 percent of the
Lake to Lake membership voted for the merger, and Lake to Lake became an
autonomous division within Land O'Lakes.
In summary, the book provides an excellent success story ofa dairy coopera-
tive. It is valuable reading for currentand newer member-patrons ofcoopera-
tives who oftendo not know aboutthe strugglesand sacrificesoftheir predeces-
sors. Theauthoralso presentsexcellentprinciplesandphilosophy for successful
operationand managementofa cooperative. The importance ofgood employ-
ees, communications with directors and members, leadership development,
cooperativeeducation, and sound business practices stands out. Lastly, thebook
will be of great interest to those who have known the employees, directors,
officers, and members of Lake to Lake during its 35-year history.
Robert A. Cropp
Director, University Centerfor Cooperatives
University ofWisconsin-Madison